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KYBERNETIKA- VOLUME 22 (1986), NUMBER 1 
VON NEUMANN SOLUTION 
IN GENERAL COALITION GAMES 
MILAN MARES 
The von Neumann solution is one of the basic solution concepts derived in the classical coali-
tion games theory. Here it is formulated for the general coalition games model and its relations 
to the set of strongly stable imputations are derived. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The model of the general coalition game was suggested in [2]. The solution concept, 
defined there as an analogy of the core and called the strong stability of imputations, 
is based on the domination relation. The classical literature on the coalition games 
theory deals also with another solution based on the same domination relation, 
namely with the von Neumann solution concept. As it can be easily formulated 
also in the notions of the general coalition games model, it is useful to compare 
it with the strong stability and to find some basic relations between both concepts. 
As the strong stability is defined in [2] and other related papers by means of so 
called weak domination relation, we use the same relation even for the definition 
of the von Neumann solution. 
1. GENERAL COALITION GAME 
In this section we briefly recall the basic notions of the general coalition game 
model used in this paper. 
The general coalition game is a pair (I, V) where / is a finite and non-empty set 
of players and Fis a mapping prescribing to aby set K <= / a subset V(K) of the real 
space R1 such that 
(1.1) V(K) is closed, 
(1.2) if x e V(K), yeR1, xt ^ y, for all i e K then y e V(K), 
79 
(1.3) V(K) 4= 0 , 
(1.4) V(K) = R' o K = 0 . 
The sets K cz I are called coalitions, any partition of/ into non-empty coalitions 
is a coalition structure, and any vector x e W1 is an imputation. For any coalition 
structure Jf we denote 
F(JT)= nV(0-
If x, j e W7 are imputations and /C C I is a coalition then we say that x dominates 
y via K and write xdomKy iff xt ^ j>, for all ieK and x ; > y\ for at least one 
i e K. For each K cz 7 we denote 
(1.5) F*(K) = { j e ffJ: there is no x e V(K) such that x domK y] . 
It can be easily verified that for any K <= / the equality V(X) u V*(K) = R1 holds, 
and that V(0) = V*(0) = R'. The set ' 
(1.6) P(K) = V(K) n V*(K) for K c / 
is called the Pareto optimum of the coalition K. We say that P(K), K cz I, is sufficient 
iff for any x e V(i<;) - V*(it) there exists y e P(K) such that y domK JC. 
We say that an imputation xe R1 is strongly stable in the game (/, V) iff there 
exists a coalition structure Jf such that 
(1.7) xeV(jr) = f)V(K) 
KeST 
a n d xeV*(L) for all L c / . 
We say that a game (/, V) is superadditive iff, for any pair of disjoint coalitions 
K, L a I, K n L = 0, the inclusion 
V(K) n V(L) c V(K u L) 
holds. We say that (7, V) is subadditive iff 
V*(K) n V*(L) c V*(/C u L) 
for any pair of disjoint coalitions K, L c: / , K n L = 0. 
Finally, by K we denote the class of all coalition structures Jf such that there 
exists a strongly stable imputation x e R' fulfilling x e V(jf). 
2. VON NEUMANN SOLUTION 
In this section we re-formulate the definition of the von Neumann solution in the 
terminology of the general coalition game model and of the domination relation 
introduced above. We present a few results concerning the mutual connections 
between the von Neumann solution and the strongly stable imputations. 
A set of imputations U c W7 is a von Neumann solution of the game (I, V) iff 
(2.1) for every x e U there exists a coalition structure cf such that x e V(jf); 
(2.2) if K cz I, K 4= 0, is a coalition, x, y e V(K) n U are imputations, then the 
relation x dom^ y cannot be valid; 
(2.3) if z e R', if j f is a coalition structure and z e V(ct), z <£ U, then there exist 
L c: J, L =j= 0, and x e U n F(L) such that x domL z. 
Theorem 1. Any non-empty von Neumann solution in a game (I, V) contains all 
strongly stable imputations. 
Proof. The statement follows from (2.3) and from the fact that a strongly stable 
imputation belongs to all sets V*(K), K czl. • 
Lemma 1. If the set of all strongly stable imputations in a game (I, V) is non-empty 
then it fulfils conditions (2.1) and (2.2). 
Proof. The statement follows from the definition of the strong stability 
immediately. • 
The last condition (2.3) need not be generally fulfilled by the set of all strongly 
stable imputations as follows from the next example. 
Example 1. Let us consider a game (I, V) where I = {1, 2, 3, 4} and 
V({1, 2}) = {x e f i 4 : x ^ 2 , x 2 ^ 5 } , 
V({3, 4}) = { x e B 4 : x 3 ^ 2 , x + ^ 2 } , 
V({1, 2, 3}) = { x e f i 4 : x , ^ 3 , x 2 ^ 3, x 3 | 3 j , 
V({2}) = {x e « 4 : x2 S 4} , V(4}) = {x e R
4 : xA g 1} , 
V(K) = { x e R 4 : x ^ 0 for all i e K} for other K c I. 
Then there exists exactly one strongly stable imputation x = (2, 5, 2, 2) achievable 
by the coalition structure X = ({1, 2}, {3, 4}). The imputation y = (3, 3, 3,1) 
achievable by the coalition structure ({1,2, 3}, {4}) is not strongly stable as there 
exists e.g. z = 0 ,4,0, 1) (in the coalition structure ({1}, {2}, {3}, {4})) or z' = 
= (0, 4, 2, 2) (in the coalition structure ({l}, {2), {3, 4})) such that 
zdom{2}j> and z' dom{2)'j>. 
However, there is no coalition K c I, K + 0, such that x e V(K) and x domKy. 
Lemma 2. Let us suppose that all Pareto optima P(K), K c / , K 4= 0, in the game 
(/, V) are sufficient and that there exist strongly stable imputations in (I, V). If 
every coalition structure ££ fulfils 
(2.4) V(S£) cz (J V(Jf) 
XsK 
then the set of all strongly stable imputations fulfils condition (2.3) (where K was 
introduced in Section 1). 
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Proof. Let us consider an imputation x e R1 such that x e V(SC) for some coalition 
structure £?, and let x be not strongly stable. Then there exists a coalition structure 
Jf e K such that x e V(X), and a coalition L d such that xe V(L) - V*(L). 
Assumption (2.4) implies that there necessarily exists a coalition structure l e K 
and a coalition M e Jl such that x e V(M) — V*(M). As the Pareto optimum P(M) 
is sufficient, there exists y e P(M) such that j domM x and, of course, yf ^ x ; for all 
i el. If j> is not strongly stable then the whole procedure may be repeated. There is 
only finite number of coalition structures in K and each of them is formed by a finite 
number of coalitions. Hence, after a finite number of the described steps we construct 
an imputation ze R1 such that z is strongly stable in the game (J, V), z{ S: y; S; x ; 
for all i e I, and z domM x. • 
Theorem 2. If (/, V) is a game with sufficient Pareto optima P(K) for all K c I, 
with a non-empty set of strongly stable imputations and such that (2.4) is fulfilled 
for any coalition structure Z£, then there exists exactly one von Neumann solution 
in (J, V), and it is identical with the set of all strongly stable imputations. 
Proof. The set of all strongly stable imputations forms, under the assumptions 
of this theorem, a von Neumann solution, as follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. 
On the other hand, if there exist more than one von Neumann solutions then all 
of them contain the set of strongly stable imputations by Theorem 1. Lemma 2 implies 
that any imputation xeR1 that is not strongly stable is dominated by some strongly 
stable imputations and, consequently, it cannot be an element of any von Neumann 
solution by (2.2). It means that the statement is true. Q 
Theorem 3. If (I, V) is a superadditive game, if all Pareto optima P(K), K <z I, 
are sufficient and if there exist strongly stable imputations in (/, V) then there exists 
exactly one von Neumann solution in (/, V), and it is identical with the set of all 
strongly stable imputations. 
Proof. The superadditivity means that for any coalition structure J T the inclusion 
V(jf) cz V(l) holds, and any strongly stable imputation xe R1 belongs to the set 
V(l). Hence, condition (2.4) is surely fulfilled, and the statement is an obvious con-
sequence of Theorem 2. 
Theorem 4. If the game (J, V) is subadditive then there exists exactly one von 
Neumann solution containing exactly one imputation x = (xt)isI e R
1 such that 
for all i e I 
V({i}) = {yeR':yiSXi}. 
Proof. It is not difficult to verify (cf. [3]) that the imputation x described by this 
theorem is the unique strongly stable imputation in the subadditive game (I, V), 
and that for any coalition K and any y e V(K) such that y + x there exists i e K 
such that X; > y;, i.e. x dom{;} y. Moreover, there is no K c J, K 4= 0, and no 
y e V(K) such that y domK x as follows from the subadditivity definition, too. It 
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means that the one-element set of imputations {x} is the unique set fulfilling (2.1), 
(2.2) and (2.3). Q 
Condition (2.4) is not necessary for the equality between the von Neumann solution 
and the set of strongly stable imputations as follows from the next example. 
Example 2. Let us consider a game (/, V) where I = {1,2,3,4} and the sets 
V(K) are the same as in Example 1 except 
V({l,2}) = {x:Xl^3,x2^5}. 
Then the imputation x = (3, 5, 2, 2) is the unique strongly stable imputation, and 
for any coalition structure Jf and any V(Jf) there exists K c J such that x dom^ y 
including the y = (3, 3, 3, l) where xdom{ 1 2} J- Nevertheless, condition (2.4) is 
not fulfilled as K = {jf} for Jf = ({1, 2},'{3, 4}) and for J? = ({1,2,3}, {4}) 
V{Se) is not a subset of V(X). 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
It was shown in the previous section that the von Neumann solution may be 
defined for the general coalition games, and that there is no essential difference 
between both definitions. 
Moreover, under not very strong assumptions there exists a strict relation between 
the von Neumann solution and strong stability concepts, as it was shown in the main 
results of this paper. 
The domination relation used above is sometimes called the weak one in order 
to distinguish it from the strong domination such that, for x, y e M1 and K a I, 
K 4= 0, x strongly dominates y via K iff xt > yt for all i e K. It is not difficult 
to verify that the strong domination relation, also often used in the literature, does 
not essentially change the results presented above. It can lead to a simplification 
of some assumptions; e.g. in case of the strong domination all Pareto optima are 
evidently sufficient (and identical with the boundary sets of V(K)). Also the set 
of strongly stable imputations is generally larger or at least not smaller if the strong 
domination is considered instead of the weak one. However, the main methods and 
concepts may be used parallelly for both types of domination and the results would 
be similar to those presented above. 
(Received November 1, 1984.) 
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